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INTRODUCTION 
Since the beginning of this century neuroscience methods have been applied to the 
investigation of social cognition in adult subjects. Reasoning about other people’s mind  and 
understanding what they think, feel or believe requires the ability to step into their “mental 
shoes” and reason according their perspective (Gallese et al., 1998). This is crucial for 
successful social interaction. Perspective taking includes the awareness of one’s own 
subjective spatial and mental space (first-person perspective, 1PP) and the ability to ascribe 
visuo-spatial perspectives and mental states (cognitive or emotional states) to another person 
(third-person perspectives, 3PP). In the present study we investigate the ability to take another 
person’s mental perspective.  
Neuroimaging studies revealed brain regions that are active when we step into another 
persons mental perspective to represent his or her experience as compared to one’s own.  For 
instance, we take a 3PP when we try to appreciate what another person thinks about a 
particular topic or feels in a given situation. Taking the mental perspective of another person, 
as opposed to the own perspective has been associated with brain activation in the inferior 
parietal cortex, including the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), medial posterior cortex 
(posterior cingulate/precuneus) and medial prefrontal cortex (David et al., 2006; Ruby et al., 
2001, 2003, 2004; Vogeley et al., 2001). Furthermore neuropsychological evidence has also 
highlighted the importance of the inferior parietal cortex (IPC) and TPJ for perspective taking 
as well as for the distinction between self and other (Decety et al., 2003a). Direct cortical 
stimulation of the right IPC has induced the phenomenon of out of body experience in an 
epileptic patient (Blanke et al., 2002), and damage to this area can lead a patient to believe 
that his own body is controlled by external forces (Mesulam, 1981). 
 
Despite the remarkable results from neuroscientific research on perspective taking in adults, 
little has been done so far to explore the neuronal development underlying these functions in 
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normal achieving children. Structural brain developmental studies have revealed changes in 
grey and white matter during late childhood, adolescence and even early adulthood. Both 
cross-sectional and longitudinal studies demonstrated that changes in frontal and parietal 
regions are especially pronounced and prolonged. Whereas white matter volume seems to 
increase linearly during the first two decades of life, grey matter development, particularly in 
posterior parietal and prefrontal cortices, increases from early childhood until about the age 
12 (around the onset of puberty) and is followed by a decline during adolescence (Giedd et 
al., 1999; Gogtay et al., 2004; Sowell et al., 2003; Toga et al., 2006). While the nature and 
time course of structural changes during development have been described in detail, few 
studies focused on functional development. A general idea coming from studies on 
development of language and executive functions is that children show similar but more 
distributed pattern compared to adults. These findings have been referred to as focalization of 
neural development (Casey et al., 2005; Durston et al., 2006). 
It is currently unknown how brain maturation influences the development of social cognition. 
Most research on the behavioral development of social cognition has been conducted in 
children between the age of 4-7 years (Astington, 1983, Baron-Cohen, 1993, Leslie, 1985), 
which indicates that major steps in social cognition are completed by that age. Although no 
study has investigated the neural development of perspective taking abilities, a handful fMRI 
studies investigate other social cognitive processes such as understanding irony (Wang, 
2006), thinking about own intentions (Blakemore, 2006) or social-knowledge retrieval 
(Pfeifer, 2007). Among these studies, there seems to be some consistency with respect to the 
direction of change in prefrontal activity. In various frontal regions a decrease of activity with 
development was found particularly in the medial prefrontal and the inferior frontal cortex 
(for review see (Blakemore, 2008).  
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Hence, on the basis of these structural and functional imaging results we hypothesize that the 
neural development of cognitive perspective taking is associated with changes in brain 
activity within the described neural network of social cognition involving posterior parietal 
regions (mainly the inferior parietal cortex) as well as prefrontal brain areas. 
 
To test this hypothesis we developed a task requiring the appraisal of leisure activities from a 
third- or first-person perspective. Leisure activities are much more self-defining during 
childhood and adolescence than school activities because they provide more opportunity for 
self-direction and initiative than school performance activities. Self-defining activities tell 
children and adolescents something about “who they really are” or “what they are like” as a 
person and are therefore essential for the distinction between oneself and other persons 
(Larson, 2001 ). During the task short statements of real life situations were presented to both 
adults and children, who were required to make judgments for themselves and for another 
person who was introduced by a story. To assure that especially children adopt the mental 
perspective of another person and to keep the level of familiarity equal across all participants 
we chose a very different and unknown personality as a third-person. Choosing a third-person 
with very different characteristics allowed us to provoke qualitative differences between 1PP 
and 3PP judgments. To introduce participants with the other person we used a story of a 
child/adult with autistic behavior- we called him Paul. The story comprised his social 
behavior at home and during kindergarten and school time, his academic skills as well as his 
special interests. Participants did not know that Paul has been diagnosed as having Asperger’s 
syndrome nor did they know any other psychiatric diagnosis.  
Since brain imaging as well as lesion studies on perspective taking in adults pointed to the 
importance of a fronto-parietal network, and structural studies showed that this network is not 
fully developed until early adulthood we expected that processing another person’s 
perspective would become increasingly efficient during development (decrease of reaction 
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times)  and is associated with changes in brain activation within the prefrontal (particularly in 
the medial and inferior frontal) and the inferior parietal cortex. We further tested whether the 
development of perspective taking is supported by a focalization of the neural network 
involved in perspective taking by means of measures of variance and signal change of neural 
activity.  
 
METHODS 
Participants 
Data were acquired from 12 children between 8.5 and 10.6 years of age (mean 10.0 years, 6 
male) and 12 adults (aged 24.6-32.3, mean 29.1, 4 male). All children were recruited from 
public schools in the city of Zurich. Participants completed the German version of the autism-
spectrum quotient questionnaire for adults or for children (AQ, Baron-Cohen, 2006) – a 
quantitative self-report instrument for assessing how many autistic traits a person has. None 
of the participants scored above the critical minimum of 30 out of 50 autistic traits (mean 
children: 18.73, mean adults: 16.35). No significant group differences (t(1,21)=-1.19,p=0.249) 
or sex differences were found (t(1,21)=0.187, p=0.854). Participants were also asked to 
indicate on an analogous scale (ranging from 0-100) how much they felt like Paul irrespective 
of sex. Female and males did not differ in their ratings (mean female=193, mean male=254, 
t(1,22)=0.904, p=0.376). Adult participants were university students. Four additional children 
had to be excluded due to extensive movement during the fMRI scanning (>5mm) and were 
therefore also excluded from behavioral analysis. All participants were right-handed as 
assessed by the Edinburgh Inventory Scale (Oldfield, 1971). None of the participants had a 
significant history of medical, psychiatric or neurological disorders on the basis of self- or 
parent-report. None of the participants used any neurotropic or psychotropic medication. 
Written informed consent was obtained from all participants, as well as written informed 
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parental consent for child participants. The study was approved by the local ethics committee 
and conducted in accordance with the guidelines set out in the Helsinki Declaration. 
 
Task Description 
Children were introduced to a virtual “other child” by reading a story about Paul a child with 
autistic behavior; adults likewise learned about a grown-up person with autistic behavior. 
During the fMRI measurement, the task required participants to make judgments about 32 
leisure activities for themselves or for the other person. Activities with and without social 
interaction (with SI, no SI) were chosen to provoke differences in judgment for the 1PP and 
3PP condition (assuming that Paul would dislike all social interactions). Separate task 
versions were created for children and for adults. The task employed a design in which the 
type of stimulus and the perspective taken by the participants were manipulated. In the self-
perspective condition, subjects were asked to evaluate how much they like to do certain 
activities. In the other-perspective condition, subjects were instructed to imagine Paul and 
answer according to his preferences and interests and to ignore their own. In all trials, subjects 
were presented first with a picture of themselves or of Paul (duration 2 seconds) to indicate 
the perspective they had to adopt for answering the upcoming question. Subsequently, a 
sentence (e.g. ‘going to a friend’s birthday party’ or ‘reading a book’) was presented in black 
on a grey background (duration 6 seconds) together with a slider for answering, followed by a 
fixation cross (500 ms). Sixteen null-events in which onlya a fixation cross was shown were 
included and presented randomly. Participants were required to make their judgment by 
pressing the left or right button with the middle or index finger of their right hand. The button 
press moved a red marker on a slide on a continuous scale from left “I don’t like to do this 
activity at all” to right “I like to do this activity very much” (the scale range was from -100 to 
+100 with no visible scale in between). The longer the left/right button is pressed, the more 
the slider moves to the left/right side of the scale. The starting point of the red marker on the 
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continuous scale was presented randomly. Each of the four conditions (1PP with SI, 1PP no 
SI, 3PP with SI, 3PP no SI) consisted of 16 trials which had to be judged according to both 
perspectives (total 64 trials). The sequence of the trials was generated randomly for each 
participant. Each activity had to be judged for themselves as well as for Paul.  
 
Experimental Procedure 
Before the scanning session we took a picture of the participant and introduced him/her to 
Paul by showing a picture of him. Then, participants were instructed to learn about the other 
Paul by reading a story about a male child/adult with autistic behavior describing his social 
behavior, academic skills as well as his interests. Participants did not know that Paul has the 
diagnose of Asperger Syndrome.  
We used different versions for adults and children. The difference between histories was that 
Paul’s biography continued until adulthood for adults, but stopped at childhood (ca. 10 years) 
for the children. Similarly, the photograph of Paul was adapted to the age of the participants. 
The story comprised 200 words for children and 293 for adults. Participants were then asked 
to retell the story and answer several questions to ensure that they understood correctly and 
could imagine the Paul’s personality. After introducing participant to Paul we carefully 
instructed them in the whole fMRI procedure and explained the task. Participants then 
practiced 5 trials from the 1PP and 5 from the 3PP. We again emphasized that it was very 
important to really try to imagine Paul and that we were interested in seeing how their brain 
works while they are thinking of him. We used MR-compatible video goggles to present the 
stimuli and additional acoustic noise protection by headphone (MRI Audio/Video System, 
Resonance Technology, Inc., USA) throughout the examinations. The task was programmed 
by Cogent implemented under MATLAB (http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/CogentGraphics/) 
 
MRI Data acquisition and analysis 
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BOLD sensitive images were collected on a 3.0 T General Electric MR-scanner using a 
gradient-echo EPI-sequence with a repetition time of 2000 ms and a 64x64 matrix. 
Altogether, 32 slices were aligned to the anterior and posterior commissure (flip angle = 50º, 
FOV= 24cm, slice thickness per volume = 3.8mm, 360 repetitions). Secondly, a three 
dimensional T1-weighted anatomical scan (FOV = 230 mm x 198 mm x 158 mm, matrix = 
224x192x132; TR = 8.6 ms; TE = 2.1 ms) of the whole brain was acquired. Images were 
analyzed using SPM5 (Statistical Parametric Mapping software, Wellcome Department of 
Cognitive Neurology, London, UK, http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). The fMRI data were 
realigned and unwrapped for movement correction and were then normalized to a SPM 
template with a resampled voxel size of 3 mm3 and smoothed with a Gaussian kernel (full 
width at half maximum: 9mm).  
For each participant the expected hemodynamic responses for each trial were modeled by two 
response functions, which were a canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF) and its 
temporal derivative. The functions were convolved with the event train of stimulus onset to 
create covariates in a general linear model. Misses were modeled as a parameter of no 
interest. Parameter estimates for four conditions (1PP with SI, 1PP no SI, 3PP with SI, 3PP no 
SI) were obtained by maximum-likelihood estimation while using a temporal high-pass filter 
(cut-off 128 s) and modeling temporal autocorrelation as an AR(1) process. Since neural 
development of perspective taking (1PP, 3PP) was the focus of our interest, we collapsed 
trials with and without social interaction. We added the analysis of the brain activation 
associated with the type of task (with SI, no SI) in the supplementary material.   
In a voxel based analysis comparison between each condition and rest, and direct comparison 
between conditions were thresholded at p<0.05 (FWE corrected, k>10) and p<0.005 
(uncorrected, k>5 voxels) for regions for which we had a strong a priori hypothesis, namely, 
the prefrontal and parietal cortex (Forman, 1995, Pfeiffer, 2007). To specifically look at 
developmental effects of perspective taking we calculated a ROI analysis on the basis of the 
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activation patterns from the main effect of 3PP and 1PP judgments. Because we have two 
independent groups the ROIs were based on the activation patters across all participants (3PP 
> 1PP and 1PP > 3PP with a threshold of p=0.005, uncorrected, k>5 voxel). The children’s 
and adults’ data were compared in 12 regions of interest (ROI). According to these main 
effects 10-mm spheres around the local maxima of each significant cluster for each contrast 
(3PP>1PP and 1PP>3PP) were created using marsbar (http://marsbar.sourceforge.net/). Mean 
percent signal changes were taken from the raw data of every study participant for all 
conditions and activated voxels. For the contrast 3PP>1PP the following coordinates were 
taken to generate ROIs: left inferior frontal cortex (x=-42 45 0), right dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (middle frontal gyurs) (x=39, y=24, z=27), left inferior parietal cortex (x = -36, y = -
57, z = 39), right precuneus (x=6, y=-69, z= 39), and right inferior parietal cortex (x=39, y=-
48, z=45) . For the contrast 1PP>3PP the following coordinates were taken to create ROIs:  
left posterior cingulate cortex (x=-3. y=-33, z= 42 and x=-6, y=-54, z=21), anterior cingulate 
cortex (x=0, y=15, z=-6), left medial prefrontal cortex (x=-9, y=48, z= 9), left middle frontal 
cortex (x=-24 y=39 z=39), left superior parietal lobule (x=-27, y=-87, z=42), right 
parahippocampal gyrus (x=36, y=54, z=0) and left middle temporal gyrus (x=-57, y=-66, 
z=21). For statistical analysis we used a repeated measure ANOVA with the within-subject 
factor perspective (1PP, 3PP) and the between-subject factor group (children, adults) for each 
ROI. To look after the potential effect of similarity between participants and Paul on brain 
responses, we correlated the ratings obtained from the participants with each ROI.  
To examine whether the differences between children and adults in brain activation are caused 
by maturation rather than by performance differences in reaction times between groups, we 
separated the groups in good and bad performers. Using the median of reaction time 
performance for 3PP-judgments in both groups we built four groups. Thereafter brain activity 
within each ROI was analyzed using a repeated measure ANOVA with perspective (1PP, 
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3PP) as within-subject factor and age (adults, children) and performance (good-performer, 
bad-performer) as between-subject factors.  
Current techniques of data analysis (e.g. SPM random effect second-level analysis) allow the 
identification of common areas of brain activation within a population. Since higher inter-
individual variability is a principle characteristic of a developing population, we compared 
intersubject-variability of brain activation between children and adults. To visualize the inter-
subject variability in location of brain activation we build probability maps in each group. A 
probability map is a measure of the spatial consistency of brain activation and shows how 
many subjects activated a particular voxel (Xiong et al., 2000). This technique allows for the 
identification of activation that is missed by group averaging and indicates what portion of the 
study population contributes to the overall group. To calculate the probability map for each 
group, we used one-sample T-maps for the contrast 3PP>1PP from each participant (threshold 
p<0.05, uncorrected ). Using MRIcroN (http://www.sph.sc.edu/comd/rorden/mricron)  we 
built the color scale which represents the percentage of subjects who activated for each voxel 
(ranging from 15%-100%). To further analyze the variability of brain activity, we estimated 
the nearest local maxima for each ROI-coordinate in each subject and calculated the standard 
deviation along the x-, y-, and z-coordinates of each group. The nearest individual local 
maxima had to be within the left parietal cortex for the ROI in the left inferior parietal cortex, 
the left and right precuneus for the ROI in the precuneus and in the right parietal cortex for 
the ROI in the right inferior parietal cortex. Otherwise it was excluded from analysis. 
Euclidean distance values d around the mean location (x0, y0, z0) for each selected ROI were 
also calculated for each subject using the following equation 
 (xi-x0)2+(yi-y0)2+(zi-z0)2 
where x, y, and z are coordinates in MNI space for each individual (i). The Mann-Whitney U-
Test was used to test for group differences in each ROI (p<0.05), because it is insensitive to 
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the assumption of independence of each coordinate. It is also more robust against violations 
of a normal distribution of population.  
 
RESULTS 
Behavioral Data  
Judgments 
Figure 1 shows the participants’ judgments for the four conditions. With the selection of 
activities with and without social interaction (with, no SI) we provoked differences in 
judgment for self and other conditions. The results (Figure 1) show that both adult and child 
participants understood the task and performed successfully in terms of their appreciation of 
Paul’s preferences: in the conditions where they had to judge whether Paul would like to do 
activities with social interactions their answers lay in the negative range whereas the answers 
for activities without interactions lay on the positive range. Repeated measures ANOVA with 
perspective (1PP, 3PP) and type of task (with SI, no SI) as within-subject factors and group 
(adults, children) as a between subjects factor revealed significant main effects of perspective 
(F(1,22)=42.24, p<0.0001) and type of task (F(1,22)=25.88, p<0.0001). There was no 
interaction between group and any condition (all F(1,22)<0.144, p>0.707).  
 
 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
Reaction times: 
Response times for judgments were analyzed using a repeated measures ANOVA with 
perspective (1PP, 3PP) and type of task (with SI, no SI) as within-subject factors and group 
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(adults, children) as a between subjects factor. There was a main effect for perspective 
(F(1,22) = 27.4, p<0.0001), which indicated that judgments were made more slowly when 
participants had to answer according to the 3PP than when they had to answer for themselves. 
We further found a significant interaction between perspective and group (F(1,22) =5.7,  p< 
0.026). Since there was no significant interaction between factors type of task (with SI, no SI) 
and perspective (1PP, 3PP) nor between the factors type of task and the group (children, 
adults) we collapsed trials with and without social interaction. Post hoc analysis showed that 
the difference between reaction times for 1PP and 3PP judgments (was significantly greater in 
children than in adults (p=0.03, mean adults: 109 msec, mean children: 292 msec) and 
decreased significantly with age (r=-0.043, p<0.05). 
Neuroimaging Results   
Main effect perspective: contrast 3PP versus 1PP judgments in children 
Children showed enhanced activation in the parietal and frontal lobes during judgments for 
another person as compared with judgments for themselves (Table 1).  
Within the parietal lobe, they activated the right and left inferior parietal cortex (BA 40), the 
post-central gyrus (BA 3) and the right precuneus (BA 7) and, within the frontal lobe, the 
right dorsolateral prefrontal (middle frontal gyrus, BA 9) and the left inferior prefrontal cortex 
(BA 46) and sublobar the right insula (BA 47).  
Main effect perspective: contrast 3PP versus 1PP judgments in adults 
 In adults, the right precuneus (BA 7) and the left inferior parietal cortex (BA 40) were more 
activated during 3PP judgments than during 1PP judgments. No other areas showed 
significant activation.  
Main effect perspective: contrast 1PP versus 3PP judgments  
In children, the main effect of 1PP versus 3PP judgments revealed activation in the left 
anterior cingulate cortex (BA 32). Adults additionally activated the posterior cingulate cortex 
(BA 23, 24), left middle frontal gyrus (BA 8), and the left inferior parietal gyrus (BA 40).  
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Interactions: perspective by age-groups 
 Voxel-based whole-brain analysis revealed no significant brain activation for the interaction 
between perspective and group. We therefore performed ROI analysis.  
 
Comparisons between children and adults 
For the ROI analysis we took the activation pattern from the main effect 3PP versus 1PP 
judgments for all participants together as described in the methods. As can be seen in Figure 2 
and 3a, adults and children showed comparable brain activity in all ROIs formed from the 
difference between 3PP and 1PP judgments, except for the right middle frontal cortex and in 
the right inferior parietal cortex. Using repeated measures ANOVA with the factor 
perspective (1PP, 3PP) and the between-subject factor group (children, adults) the statistical 
analyses revealed a significant interaction between group and perspective in right dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (middle frontal gyrus) (F(1,22)=4.27, p<0.05) and the right inferior parietal 
cortex (F(1,22)=4.14, p<0.05), but not in the other ROIs (all F(1,22)<0.274 p>0.05). The 
comparison between children and adults for the ROIs from the contrast 1PP versus 3PP 
judgment yielded no significant main effect of group (all F(1,22)<1.68, p>0.208 group 
interaction with any of the ROIs (all F(1,22)<3.515, p>0.074 ). We further analyzed the effect 
of similarity between the participants and Paul by correlating the ratings of similarity with 
percent signal change within each ROI. None of the ROIs correlated with similarity (all 
r<0.329).  
 
Comparison between good and bad performers  
 
To examine whether the differences between children and adults in brain activation are 
predominantly caused by maturation effects or by performance differences between groups, 
we 
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separated the groups into good and a bad performers (see methods). Brain activity within each 
ROI was analyzed using a repeated measure ANOVA with perspective (1PP, 3PP) as within-
subject factor and age (adults, children) and performance (good-performer, bad-performer) as 
between-subject factors. Statistical analysis revealed no significant two-way and three-way 
interaction with performance in any brain region (all two-way interactions: F(1,20)< 1.41, 
p>0.248) and  all three-way interactions: F(1,20)< 3.14, p>0.092).  
 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Figure 2 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
 
Figure 3A shows the probability maps for the contrast 3PP versus 1PP. The probability-maps 
suggest that children deploy a more extended neural network than adults. Within the frontal 
cortex, the activation seems to become more focal with development and in the more 
posterior regions we can see a shift from bilateral to unilateral left parietal activation. For the 
ROIs within the frontal lobule, we could not calculate the variability in location of individual 
local maxima because we had to exclude 5 from 12 adults since they did not show activity 
within the frontal lobule for the contrast 3PP>1PP. For the ROIs in the parietal lobule, the 
variability in location of individual local maxima did not seem to differ between groups 
(Figure 3B). We had to exclude six participants from the analysis because their data did not 
yield activation within our predefined search range (see methods): three within the left 
inferior parietal cortex (2 children, 1 adult), one within the precuneus (1 adult) and two within 
the right inferior parietal cortex (2 adults). If at all, adults showed a larger variation than 
children in the right parietal cortex. 
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This observation was confirmed in the analysis of the mean Euclidean distance values. The 
distances varied in these ROIs from 9.1 to 20.5 mm (see Fig. 3C). The Mann-Whitney U-Test 
showed no significant difference in Euclidean distances between the two groups in the left 
inferior parietal cortex (p>0.76, 2-tailed) and the precuneus (p>0.109, 2-tailed). Within the 
right inferior parietal cortex we found a tendency for a group difference in the Euclidian 
distance (p<0.066), indicating that adults showed larger variability (22.5 mm) than children 
(14.4 mm).  
--------------------------------------- 
Table 1 and 2 about here (coordinates) 
--------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Figure 3 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
DISCUSSION 
 
Brain activation during participants’ reasoning about another person’s mind was compared 
with brain activity when they reflected upon their own preferences Reasoning about others, 
and understanding what they think, what they feel or what they believe involves stepping into 
their ‘mental shoes’ and taking their perspective. The ability to understand other people’s 
mind and realize that they can have different perspectives is commonly referred to as having a 
“theory of mind”. It requires the ability to distinguish “self” from ”other” and appreciate 
another’s person intentions, beliefs or preferences.  
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We would argue that cognitive perspective taking becomes increasingly efficient (decrease of 
URT between 3PP and 1PP) after the age at which classic theory of mind tasks are 
accomplishable. Additionally, development of cognitive perspective taking shows changes in 
brain activity within a neural network involving particularly posterior parietal regions but also 
prefrontal brain areas. We would further argue that increased efficiency in perspective taking 
during development is supported by a focalization of the neural network involved. In contrast 
to previous imaging studies on cognitive development we were able to show by using 
measures of inter-subject variability analysis that children activated a coherent but more 
extended neural network during judgments for others than adults.  
 
Maturation accompanies increased efficacy in perspective taking 
There is currently considerable debate about the way in which we switch viewpoints from 
oneself to another person in everyday social interaction. According to the simulation theory, 
we place ourselves in another person’s position by asking what we might believe or desire in 
a similar situation and simulate them (Taylor et al., 1994). Alternatively, the “theory-theory” 
claims that that we use a common sense psychological theory to understand other people’s 
mind, rather than internally simulating them (Gopnik and Meltzoff, 1997). However, when 
taking another person’s perspective it is not always sufficient only to simulate what I myself 
would do in the other person’s situation. I need to imagine what the other person would do in 
her or his situation. In addition to “putting ourselves in another person’s shoes” we therefore 
need to distinguish our own preferences from another person’s intentions or preferences. Our 
behavioral data indicate that all participants, irrespective of age, inhibited their own 
egocentric perspective and mentally stepped outside their viewpoint to adopt the other 
person’s preferences. Thus, in respect of this debate the ability to appreciate Paul’s 
preferences appropriately cannot only be explained by the simulation theory.  To appraise 
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Paul’s preferences appropriately participants need to develop a ‘theory ‘about the mind of a 
person like Paul. 
 
Despite the qualitatively equivalent performance between children and adults, we 
quantitatively found a significant interaction in reaction times between group and perspective, 
which indicated that differences between self and other judgments decrease with age. The 
reaction time differences could not have been due to any differences in stimuli since we 
presented the same stimuli in both conditions. Several studies in adults have reported longer 
reaction times for 3PP than for 1PP (D'argembeau et al., 2007; David et al., 2006; Vogeley et 
al., 2004), although in some studies the differences were not significant (Ruby, 2003, 2004). 
In this context Choudhury and colleagues recently compared 3PP and 1PP reaction time 
differences between children, adolescents and adults (Choudhury et al., 2006). They also 
found a significant decrease in reaction time differences with age but in contrast to our 
findings the difference between 3PP and 1PP spread almost equally in both directions 
(3PP>1PP and 1PP>3PP), whereas none of our children showed faster reaction time for 3PP 
than for 1PP. Taken together, our behavioral results indicate that perspective taking in 
children seems to be generally established, but that their way of processing is less proficient 
than in adults.  
 
Neural development of perspective taking 
The focus of the present study was the development of the neural bases for processing other 
person’s mental perspectives. The present data for 1PP processing are in good accordance 
with studies on neural correlates related to the self-processing and with self- perspective 
studies (Damasio et al., 2000; Piefke et al., 2003; Vogeley et al., 2004). Since we did not find 
any developmental differences in brain activity related to 1PP processing, subsequently only 
brain activation that is associated with 3PP processing will be discussed.  
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For 3PP compared to 1PP processing, adults activated the precuneus and the left inferior 
parietal cortex. Children additionally activated the left inferior frontal cortex, the right 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the right parietal cortex. The significant interaction between 
age and perspective n the right dorsolateral prefrontal and in the right inferior parietal cortex 
indicates that these cortical regions play an important role in the development of perspective 
taking.  
An increasing number of imaging (Ruby & Decety, 2001, 2003, 2004; Saxe, 2006; Saxe et al., 
2005) and lesion studies in adults (Samson et al., 2004) point to the importance of the 
posterior parietal regions in relation to perspective taking. It has been proposed that the 
inferior parietal cortex is critical for the ability to distinguish between self and other (Decety 
et al., 2003b). This region was specifically involved when participants imagined another 
person being the agent of an action, imagined how another person feels in a given situation, 
what another person thinks or how another person experiences pain but not when they 
imagined these situations for themselves (Jackson et al., 2006; Ruby & Decety, 2001, 2003, 
2004). Several studies in adults reported that the inferior parietal cortex in the right 
hemisphere was mainly involved in perspective taking whereas others found it more in the left 
hemisphere (David et al., 2006; Vogeley et al., 2004). Even clinical neuropsychology reported 
mixed findings. Samson and colleagues (Samson, 2004) reported evidence from three brain-
damaged patients that the left TPJ is necessary for reasoning about other person’s mind, while 
Blanke and colleagues (Blanke, 2002) referred to the importance of the right hemisphere. In 
the latter study direct cortical stimulation of this region induced an out-of-body experience, 
which is a 3PP of oneself.  So far the contribution of each parietal lobule is still unclear since 
lateralization effects have not been investigated systematically. However, two recent studies 
demonstrated a selective impairment of self-other distinctions when repetitive transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (TMS) was applied over the right inferior parietal lobule as participants 
performed a perceptual task involving discrimination between photographs of themselves and 
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of a familiar face (Uddin et al., 2006). Self-other judgments on whole arm reaching 
movements (Preston et al., 2008) were also impaired when TMS was applied over the right 
but not over the left inferior parietal cortex. The additional 3PP specific activation in the right 
IPL in children compared with adults might therefore indicate that children need more self-
other discrimination during 3PP processing than adults. 
In comparison to adults, children additionally activated prefrontal brain regions during the 
processing of another person’s perspective. The significant interaction between age and 
activation in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex indicated that only children specifically 
activated the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex during 3PP.   
Even though there are only a few studies on the development of the neural network 
underlying social cognitive processes, several authors reported a decrease of frontal activation 
with age. Using a similar task, Pfeiffer et al. (Pfeifer et al., 2007) found the medial prefrontal 
cortex (mPFC) more activated in children than in adults while they reported whether short 
phrases described themselves or a highly familiar other person (Harry Potter). Another 
neuroimaging study found that the mPFC was more active in adolescents than in adults while 
participants were thinking about their own intention compared to thinking about physical 
causality (Blakemore et al., 2007). Because both of these studies focused on self-related 
processing comparison with our results is limited. Wang and colleagues  investigated the 
development of the ability to understand irony, which requires the ability to separate the 
literal meaning of a comment from its intended meaning. Again, children and adolescents 
activated the mPFC and the left inferior frontal gyrus more than adults (Wang et al., 2006, 
2007).  
Thus, the present findings seem to be in line with the previous developmental studies in terms 
of the decrease of prefrontal brain activation. However, in contrast to the reported findings we 
mainly observed a decrease in activation within dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) 
instead of medial prefrontal cortex. The DLPFC is known to play a critical role in executive 
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function, particularly in cognitive control (Aron et al., 2004; Blasi et al., 2006; Bunge et al., 
2002; Fecteau et al., 2007; Knoch et al., 2007; Knoch et al., 2006; Menon et al., 2001). From 
developmental psychology we know that higher cognitive control and attention functions 
develop long into adolescence (Davidson et al. 2006). Interestingly several social 
psychological studies have demonstrated that even adults frequently use self-knowledge as 
the primary basis for developing a model of what others know and feel, which has been 
described as a default mode of reasoning about others’ mind. This egocentric bias can be 
interpreted as failure to suppress one’s own perspective (Gilovich et al., 2002; Nickerson, 
1999; Royzman et al., 2003; Vorauer et al., 1999). Considering this background the 3PP 
specific activation of the DLPFC in children may indicate that processing a 3PP requires 
children more than adults to inhibit their own prepotent egocentric perspective while they 
reason about Paul’s perspective. 
 
A possible explanation for the differences in brain activation in children compared to adults is 
cortical maturation, in particular grey matter reorganization and white matter increase 
throughout adolescence and early adulthood. Since the prefrontal cortex and the inferior 
parietal cortex are among the last brain regions to mature (Gogtay et al., 2004) it is plausible 
that these region contains less well functioning connections, leading to more activation for 
tasks that recruit them. Alternatively one can argue that more attention is needed by children 
to perform the task (judge according to Paul). Since we did not find performance related 
differences in brain activation we can rule out this argument.  
In addition to the frontal and parietal cortex we found the precuneus to be specifically 
involved in 3PP processing in children and even more pronouncedly in adults. Several 
perspective taking studies found that the precuneus was activated during perspective taking. 
Its posterior part, which we found to be involved in 3PP processing, has recently been found 
to be preferentially activated during recollection of imagined rather than viewed items 
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(Lundstrom et al., 2005). Since participants did not personally know Paul and due to the fact 
that the story about him did not contain any explicit hint about how to answer the questions, 
they really had to imagine Paul’s preferences rather than retrieve information from memory. 
The precuneus is also known as part of the so called “default network”: A network of brain 
structures (including medial frontal, parietal and temporal areas) displaying the highest 
metabolic rates when participants are at rest but are ‘deactivated’ during cognitively effortful 
tasks (Gusnard et al., 2001; Raichle et al., 2001). However, in the context of our results its 
worth mentioning that there is a remarkable overlap between brain areas typically involved in 
social cognitive tasks and the ‘default system’. Thus, it has been argued that the resemblance 
of brain regions engaged in social cognition as well as during “resting states” suggest that 
human beings might have a predisposition for social cognition to which they return when not 
explicitly forced to an effortful task (Schilbach et al., 2008). At this point we refer to Cavanna 
(2006) for review about the precuneus and its functional and behavioral correlates (Cavanna 
et al., 2006) and at Schildbach (2008) for an excellent overview about the relation between the 
default and the social cognitive networks of the brain.  
Intersubject variablity in location of brain activity 
Previous neuroimaging studies on development, reported similar patterns of neural activation 
among children and adults, whilst children convey more distributed patterns of neural 
activation and a decrease of BOLD signal as compared to adults. Such a change in patterns of 
neural activity has been referred to as a focalization of neural development (Casey et al., 
2005; Durston et al., 2006). The usual explanation for greater variation in neural activity 
across brain regions is that cognitive strategies are less efficient in children, whereas 
enhanced activity in focal brain areas during maturation has been interpreted as being due to 
increased efficiency and neural pruning. A problem, however, with interpreting focalization in 
brain imaging is that differences in neural activity can be confounded by differences in 
variability between groups: a more heterogeneous or incoherent pattern of neural activity not 
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only leads to a more distributed network but also to a reduction of neural activity. Thus, to 
determine if focalization of neural activity during maturation occurs, one has to disentangle 
measures of variance and measures of signal change (Berl et al., 2006; Xiong et al., 2000).  
The probability-maps (figure 3a) showed that children deploy a more extended neural 
network than adults. Probability maps provide support for a developmental shift from frontal 
to posterior and from bilateral to unilateral within parietal activation. Since 5 adults did not 
show any frontal brain activation for the contrast 3PP>1PP, the comparison of the inter-
subject variability in location of frontal brain activity between children and adults could not 
be calculated (figure 3b-c). In parietal areas, we found no indication for lower activation in 
children, while the probability maps indicate that children activate a more extended network 
than adults. Additionally, children showed a similar (or even reduced) degree of variance in 
the distribution of local maxima in neural activity as compared with adults. These findings 
suggest that children activated a coherent but more extended neural network of activity. This 
pattern of neural development is compatible with the hypothesis that an immature network 
has extensive activation because the network is not fully pruned. The findings do not support 
hypotheses on diffuse and dispersive networks in children, as has been suggested for different 
tasks (Berl, 2006, Durston, 2006).  
Three potential weaknesses of the study should be mentioned: first, the significance of the 
study may be hampered due to the small sample sizes of the two groups. Second, the ability of 
taking another person’s perspective may depend on the similarity or dissimilarity, 
respectively, of that person to the own personality which might have an impact on brain 
activation. We obtained the degree of similarity only by asking participants how much they 
feel alike Paul generally and did not find any significant correlations.  For further studies, it 
would be interesting to explore the degree of similarity in more detail (for example by using a 
questionnaire) and investigate how it influences the ability to reason according to a third-
person’s perspective in children and adults and furthermore to explore its effect on brain 
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activation. In this context Mitchell (Mitchell et al., 2006) could show that a region in the 
mPFC linked to self-referential thoughts was activated during judgments according the 
perspective of a similar other person but not according a dissimilar other person. The overlap 
between judgments of self and a similar other person suggest that participants can use 
knowledge about themselves to infer the mental states of similar others. Moreover, since 
children show more difficulties in cognitive control, it would be interesting to explore the 
degree of self-suppression during perspective taking in dependence of the similarity to the 
other person. Third, according to Kriegeskorte (Kriegeskorte et al., 2009) there is a certain 
danger to commit a type I error by using the same dataset for statistical analysis and 
generating ROIs. Since we only built ROIs 1) after verifying our hypotheses about the brain 
location associated with processing a third-person’s perspective (prefrontal cortex and inferior 
parietal cortex) and 2) for each significant cluster (there was no selection of clusters) we argue 
for the present approach. There would have been the possibility to built ROIs according to the 
literature to test our hypothesis. Since we were especially interested in developmental effects 
and there is no developmental study investigating perspective taking in children or 
adolescents, we would have missed important information by generating ROIs according to 
the adult literature. We nevertheless additionally performed a ROI analysis according to the 
literature. An adult study for our hypothesis about the parietal cortex brain activation and a 
developmental study for the hypothesis about the prefrontal cortex activation were used. The 
results confirmed our findings about the decrease of prefrontal cortex activation with age. In 
contrast to our ROI analysis in the right inferior parietal cortex there was no significant 
interaction between perspective and age-groups in the ROI of the right inferior parietal cortex 
based on the literature (see supplementary materials).   
We conclude that the neuronal network underlying perspective taking is generally established 
in eight year old children: 1) because children showed no more variance within the adult 
neural network, 2) because the more widespread activation patterns cannot be explained by 
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greater inter-subject variance in children, 3) because the variability between areas within the 
children’s network did not differ, and 4) differences in neural activity can be attributed to 
maturation, not to performance differences between adults and children. Children use a 
coherent but larger neural network to solve the task. One might speculate that children have 
not yet developed a specific approach to infer the perspective of others and thereby activated 
additional regions. Since adults are more experienced in social interaction with a variety of 
different personalities and thus are more skilled in perspective taking, they may have 
developed specific “modules” and use an efficient strategy to think about Paul’s preferences, 
which presumably has been learned and reinforced from past experiences.  
Taken together this is the first study on cognitive perspective taking in children that reveals 
the development of neural networks beyond the age of eight years. From developmental 
psychology studies we know that higher order cognitive function such as cognitive control 
develops into adolescence and is relevant in relation to a number of developmental disorders. 
The development of perspective taking abilities beyond six years of age is much less 
investigated, although respectful and considerate behavior cannot emerge without a 
sophisticated understanding of other people’s perspectives. 
 The developmental differences we observed in this study cannot be attributed to qualitative 
performance differences since the behavioral output is the same in both age groups, but it 
seems that the children’s strategy is less efficient (longer reaction times). Furthermore, we 
have been able to specify that neural development of perspective taking accompanies a shift 
of brain activity from frontal to posterior brain regions and from bilateral to unilateral left 
brain activation in the parietal lobule. This supports and extends the focalization model of 
neural development. Since the additionally activated right inferior parietal cortex in children 
did not show more inter-subject variability than the other brain areas, we conclude that 
children use a qualitatively different, but coherent network.  
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Table 1 
Peaks of Activity in Children and Adults during Direct Comparison of 1PP- and 3PP Processing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Clusters in a priori regions of interest and survive a threshold of p<0.005 for magnitude, k>5 voxels; All other clusters 
survive a threshold of p<0.05; k>10 voxels FWE corrected. BA=putative Brodmann's area; x, y, z =MNI coordinates; 
k=number of voxels in a cluster 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   coordinates   
Contrast  Area BA x y z t- 
value 
k 
3PP >1PP Precuneus 31 21 -57 30 3.95 20 
children Inferior parietal gyrus 40 36 -39 42 3.82 28 
  40 -36 -57 39 3.60 19 
 Post-central gyrus 3 57 -18 33 3.39 8 
 Middle frontal gryrus 9 48 27 33 3.71 37 
  Insula 13 33 21 0 3.33 5 
adults precuneus 7 3 -72 48 4.24 81 
  Inferior parietal gyrus 7 -33 -63 42 3.25 6 
1PP > 3PP     
children Anterior cingulate gyrus 32 -3 45 0 4.49 20 
 Brainstem 3 -39 -39 4.32 10 
adults Anterior cingulate gyrus 32 -6 45 15 5.03 221 
  24 9 27 15 4.10 9 
 Cingulate gyrus 24 9 3 24 3.96 6 
  32 -15 3 42 3.35 5 
 Posterior cingulate gyrus 23 -12 -51 18 3.78 14 
 Middle frontal gyrus 8 18 -15 63 3.74 39 
 Inferior parietal gyrus 40 -57 -30 24 3.59 8 
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Figure 1 
A) This figure shows participants’ judgments (mean and standard error) according the first-person and third-
person perspective (1PP, 3PP) for activities with and without social interaction (with/no SI)  B) Reaction times 
in msec for 1PP and 3PP and reaction time differences between 3PP and 1PP judgments are shown. 
Figure 2 A-C 
A-B) These figures show the main effect of 3PP versus 1PP judgments for all participants together. Statistical 
maps are thresholded at p<0.005 and overlaid on a canonical T1 anatomical image. The signal change (%) and 
standard error of 1PP (light grey) and 3PP (dark grey) in the ROIs of the left parietal gyrus (x=-36, y=-57, 
z=39)), precuneus (6, -69, 39), right parietal gyrus (39 -48 45), the left inferior frontal cortex (x=-42, y=45, z=0) 
and right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (x=39, y=24, z=27). Adults and children are shown separately. 
Significant interactions (*) between perspective and group thresholded at p<0.05.  
C) This figure shows the main effect of 3PP versus 1PP for children (yellow), adults (red) and the overlap 
between children and adults (orange). 
 
Figure 3A-C 
A) This figure shows the probability maps thresholded at p<0.05 and overlaid an a canonical T1 anatomical 
image for children and adults separately for the contrast 3PP-1PP.  
B) This figure shows the inter-subject variability in locations of activation (mm) for each region of interest  1) 
left inferior parietal cortex (x= -36, y=-57, z=39; 2) precuneus (6, -69, 39); and right inferior parietal cortex (39, 
-48, 45). Each bar graph represents one standard deviation in x-, y-, and z-coordinates. C) Each bar graph 
represents the average Euclidean distance (mm) around the mean location for each brain region. The error bars 
represent standard errors.  
 
 
 
Supplementary Material 
Figure 4-5 
Figure 4 and 5 show the main effect of type of task (with SI, without SI) in children and adults. Statistical maps 
are thresholded at t=3.3, k>10 voxels and and overlaid on a canonical T1 anatomical image 
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